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1 
BATTLE OF THE BAND:  EXPLORING 
THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
SECTION 2(A) OF THE LANHAM ACT 
AND THE FATE OF DISPARAGING, 
SCANDALOUS, AND IMMORAL 
TRADEMARKS IN A CONSUMER-
DRIVEN MARKET 
Tanya Behnam* 
In the 2016-2017 term, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
Matal v. Tam, holding that the Lanham Act’s section 2(a) ban on 
disparaging trademarks—which prevents registration of any trademarks 
that the PTO deems to be disparaging to any groups or institutions—is 
unconstitutional.  Although meant to only apply to section 2(a)’s ban on 
disparaging trademarks, the Court’s decision increases the likelihood 
that section 2(a)’s still-standing ban on scandalous and immoral marks 
are unconstitutional as well.  
This Comment first reviews the basic principles of trademark law 
and the Lanham Act, summarizes Simon Tam’s legal battles, and briefly 
presents the conflicting case of Pro-Football v. Blackhorse.  This 
Comment explores the failings of section 2(a)’s bans, its suppression of 
free speech, and its divergence from the goals of federal trademark law.  
Finally, this Comment analyzes Matal’s applicability to scandalous and 
immoral marks and Matal’s impact on future trademark registration in a 
consumer-driven marketplace. 
 
 
 
                                                           
  * J.D. Candidate at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 2018.  The author would like to 
thank Professor Aimee Dudovitz and the Editorial Board of the Entertainment Law Review of 
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles for their assistance in publishing this article.  The author would 
also like to give a special thank you to her parents, Imra and Behzad Behnam, for their lifelong 
and unwavering support. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, international singer Justin Bieber received a public 
rebuking when, following his visit to the Anne Frank Museum in 
Amsterdam, he remarked that Holocaust victim Anne Frank 
“[h]opefully . . . would have been a Belieber.”1  Recently, celebrity 
designer Marc Jacobs drew heavy criticism for allegedly exhibiting 
cultural appropriation after dressing his Caucasian runway models in 
dreadlock wigs during New York Fashion Week.2  And former 
American Idol runner-up Bo Bice angrily took to the media after a fast 
food chain employee “referred to him as ‘that white boy’ as he waited 
for his order.”3  These incidents reflect our increasing sensitivity to 
words, images, and actions we consider offensive or insulting.4  People 
are frequently and easily offended, now more than ever before.  
Technological advances have connected the world, resulting in 
worldwide exposure and societal retribution for even isolated off-color 
remarks that, years ago, would likely have been brushed off.5  This 
heightened sensitivity even manifests itself on a government level: The 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has recently 
cancelled or refused registration to multiple trademarks for being too 
disparaging.6 
                                                           
1. See Alan Duke, Justin Bieber Hopes Anne Frank ‘Would Have Been a Belieber’, CNN 
(Apr. 26, 2013, 2:48 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/14/showbiz/bieber-anne-frank/ [https:// 
perma.cc/JG5Z-G7RD]. 
2. Valeria Safronva, Marc Jacobs’s Use of Faux Locks on Models Draws Social Media 
Ire, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/18/fashion/marc-jacobs-
models-dreadlocks-social-media-response-new-york-fashion-week.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/ 
347V-6C Z5]. 
3. Michele Amabile Angermiller, ‘American Idol’ Alum Bo Bice Takes Aim at Popeyes 
Over Being Called ‘White Boy’, BILLBOARD (Jan. 4, 2017), http://www.billboard.com/articles/ 
news/7647005/american-idol-bo-bice-popeyes [https://perma.cc/AGB5-DP8J]. 
4. See Eleanor Halls, Millennials. Stop Being Offended By, Like, Literally Everything, GQ 
(Aug. 12, 2016), http://www.gq-magazine.co.uk/article/millennials-created-generation-snowflake 
[https://perma.cc/9TWT-EDXD]. 
5. Bradley Campbell & Jason Manning, The New Millennial ‘Morality’:  Highly Sensitive 
and Easily Offended, TIME (Nov. 17, 2015), http://time.com/4115439/student-protests-micro 
aggressions/ [https://perma.cc/PP2R-AZ6Y]; Halls, supra note 4. 
6. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  
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In this age of political correctness, however, some social groups 
insist on pushing the limits on what is socially acceptable by using and 
glorifying the words, images, and actions that others find distressing.7  
By challenging stereotypes, these groups encourage dialogue about 
gender, race, religion, and other emotionally charged topics.8  One way 
groups challenge negative stereotypes is by “reclaiming” an offensive 
word or term.9  To do so, a “derogatory sign or signifier is consciously 
employed by the ‘original’ target of the derogation, often in a positive 
or oppositional sense.”10  For instance, when the African American 
community reclaims the word “nigger,” and women reclaim the word 
“cunt,” they engage in value reversal, replacing the “negative 
connotative value” of the terms “with a positive one.”11  
During the United States Supreme Court’s 2016–2017 Term, a 
controversial example of this unique crossroads—wherein efforts are 
made to both avoid and confront offensive speech—appeared on the 
national stage.12  On June 19, 2017, the Supreme Court issued its 
opinion in Matal v. Tam (“Matal”), a case centered around one band’s 
efforts to publicly reclaim an offensive term.13  Matal, previously 
                                                           
7. See Anita Henderson, What’s in a Slur?, 78 AM. SPEECH 52, 65 (2003); Robin 
Brontsema, A Queer Revolution:  Reconceptualizing the Debate Over Linguistic Reclamation, 17 
COLO. RES. IN LINGUISTICS  1, 9 (2004). 
8. See generally Brooke Barnett & Randy Williams, Leading Conversations About 
Racism on Predominantly White Campuses, INSIGHT INTO DIVERSITY, http://www.insightinto 
diversity.com/leading-conversations-about-racism-on-predominantly-white-campuses/ 
[https://perma.cc/U7T3-M83C]; Jessica Bennett, How to Fight Back Against Sexism at Work, 
COSMOPOLITAN (Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.cosmopolitan.com/career/a61855/fight-back-
sexism-workplace/ [https://perma.cc/JJ9C-VWVE]; Chiara A. Sottile, Dakota Access Pipeline 
Fight Watched on Facebook Live around World, NBC NEWS (Nov. 5, 2016, 7:06 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/dakota-pipeline-protests/dakota-access-pipeline-fight-
watched-facebook-live-around-world-n67836 [https://perma.cc/D78K-Q7UY]; Women Fight 
Back Against Sexist GOP Outside Trump Tower, TELESUR (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.telesurtv 
.net/english/news/Women-Fight-Back-Against-Sexist-GOP-Outside-Trump-Tower-20161012-
0015.html [https://perma.cc/9WMW-SNHE].  
9. Brontsema, supra note 7, at 1.  
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 9; Henderson, supra note 7, at 65.  
12. See Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016), cert. granted, (No. 174, 2016 Term) 
13. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1744 (2017). 
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identified as Lee v. Tam and In re Tam, documents the journey of The 
Slants, a band that endeavored to reclaim the derogatory term “slant.”14  
Despite the musical group’s growing popularity, the PTO deemed the 
band’s name disparaging to Asian Americans and repeatedly denied 
trademark protection to its lead singer Simon Tam.15  In In re Tam, the 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals struck down as unconstitutional the 
Lanham Act’s ban on disparaging trademarks.16  This decision went 
head-to-head with Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse—then on appeal in 
the Fourth Circuit—in which a district court upheld the constitutionality 
of the Lanham Act’s section 2(a).17  Then, in its June decision, the 
Supreme Court affirmed In re Tam,18 a holding that greatly impacts the 
future of trademark registration and regulation within the United 
States.19 
The Matal Court’s determination that section 2(a)’s disparagement 
clause is unconstitutional—because trademarks are private speech—was 
correct.  Moving forward, this same holding should also be applied to 
section 2(a)’s ban on immoral and scandalous marks.  Extending 
Matal’s holding to immoral and scandalous marks is essential to 
upholding the First Amendment’s freedoms.  Moreover, fears that Matal 
will lead to a flood of federal registration of disparaging, immoral, and 
scandalous marks are groundless, as an overwhelming portion of the 
market will likely reject the use of such trademarks. 
This comment focuses on the Lanham Act’s ban on disparaging, 
immoral, and scandalous trademarks.  Specifically, this comment 
explores the vague nature of section 2(a)’s bans, its suppression of free 
speech, and its divergence from federal trademark law’s goals.  Part II 
                                                           
14. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1331.  
15. In re Tam, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d 1305, at *1313 (T.T.A.B. 2013). 
16. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1358.  
17. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 489 (E.D. Va. 2015); Brief for 
Pro-Football, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2-3, Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 
(2016) (No. 15-1293).  
18. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1747. 
19. Joanna Diakos & Thomas W. Dollar, Trademark Law Update:  SCOTUS to Decide 
Whether Ban on Registering ‘Disparaging Marks’ Is Unconstitutional, NAT’L L. REV.  (Nov. 8, 
2016), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/trademark-law-update-scotus-to-decide-whether-
ban-registering-disparaging-marks [https://perma.cc/MU69-3ERY].  
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discusses trademark law, including its purpose and significance.  Part III 
examines Matal v. Tam, its procedural history, and The Slants’ journey 
to achieving trademark registration.  Finally, Part IV analyzes the 
failings of section 2(a), Matal’s applicability to scandalous and immoral 
marks, and Matal’s impact on future trademark registration. 
II. THE TRADEMARK REGISTRATION PROCESS 
A. What is a Trademark? 
In 1946, Congress enacted the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1051), 
also known as the Trademark Act of 1946.20  Established under the 
power of the Commerce Clause, the Lanham Act “provides for a 
national system of trademark registration and protects the owner of a 
federally registered mark against the use of similar marks if such use is 
likely to result in consumer confusion, or if the dilution of a famous 
mark is likely to occur.”21   
Under the Lanham Act, a trademark is defined “as including ‘any 
word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof’ used by any 
person ‘to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . from those 
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the 
goods.’”22 To obtain registration, a markholder must pay a fee to the 
PTO, verify that the mark in question is used in commerce,23 and assert 
that no other person has the right to use the mark.24  
                                                           
20. .Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1752 (2017); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 
505 U.S. 763, 763 (1992). 
21. Lanham Act, CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law. 
cornell.edu/wex/lanham_act [https://perma.cc/WYV5-PSKZ]. 
22. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 764.  For instance, international fast-food chain 
McDonalds has registered trademarks for its distinctive golden arches (logo), its slogans (“I’m 
Lovin’ it”), its name, and even the prefix “Mc.”  The PTO has deemed these words, symbols, and 
phrases to identify McDonalds and only McDonalds.  See Logos, MCDONALD’S, http://corporate. 
mcdonalds.com/content/mcd/newsroom/image_and_video_library/logos.html [https://perma.cc/ 
CHJ8-RS5J].   
23. Applicants may also file under an “Intent to Use” (ITU) application.  Under such an 
application, the trademark need not be in commercial use at the time of filing; it need only be 
used in commerce within a certain time period following application to achieve registration dating 
back to the application date.  15 U.S.C. § 1052(b) (2017); see 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2017). 
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1051. 
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B. The Purpose of Trademark Law 
Trademark registration protects both the public and the 
markholder.25  For a trademark to receive protection, the mark must be 
source identifying—it must inform consumers of the source of goods or 
services.26  Protecting a registered mark and prohibiting all others from 
using it safeguards consumers against mistakenly purchasing counterfeit 
products.27  It also protects the markholder from misappropriation of his 
or her investment by giving the markholder the power to prevent others 
from using it.28  This keeps potential infringers from “reap[ing] where 
[they have] not sown,” and allows the markholder to fully enjoy the 
fruits of his or her labor.29  In other words, trademark law “make[s] 
infringement and piracy unprofitable.”30  
C. Why Register a Trademark? 
Trademark registration with the PTO is not a prerequisite to 
bringing a trademark-infringement claim.31  Source-identifying marks 
used in commerce are generally protected under the common law and 
state legislation.32  Registering a mark with the PTO, however, affords 
markholders crucial benefits not available at common law.33  These 
                                                           
25. S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946). 
26. P. Sean Morris, The Economics of Distinctiveness:  The Road to Monopolization in 
Trade Mark Law, 33 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 321, 323 (2011); William T. Vuk, Note, 
Protecting Baywatch and Wagamama:  Why the European Union Should Revise the 1989 
Trademark Directive to Mandate Dilution Protection for Trademarks, 21 FORDHAM  INT’L L.J. 
861, 861 (1998). 
27. Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 1980). 
28. Vuk, supra note 26, at 867–68. 
29. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239–40 (1918). 
30. S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 
31. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2015).   
32. Id. (“The markholder may still generally use the mark as it wishes; without federal 
registration, it simply lacks access to certain federal statutory enforcement mechanisms for 
excluding others from confusingly similar uses of the mark”). 
33. Should I Register My Trademark?, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/basics/register.jsp [https://perma.cc/7QJY-ULLF]. 
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benefits, created by the Lanham Act, include addition of the mark to the 
principal register, legal presumption of ownership of the mark, 
constructive notice to the public of a markholder’s ownership of the 
mark, the right to display the registered trademark symbol (®) alongside 
the mark, permission to bring an action regarding the mark in federal 
court, the ability to collect profits or damages in an infringement suit, 
basis for registering the mark in foreign nations, and the right to have 
United States Customs and Border Protection prevent other entities 
from importing infringing goods bearing a registrant’s marks.34  In other 
words, although a trademark not protected by the PTO may still be a 
defensible mark, it lacks many of the crucial advantages that the 
Lanham Act affords.  Today, over “two million marks . . . have active 
federal certificates of registration.”35 
D. Bars to Trademark Registration 
Before the PTO approves a mark for federal registration, the mark 
must clear several hurdles, outlined in section 2 of the Lanham Act.36  
For instance, trademarks bearing a flag or insignia of the United States 
or any other state or nation cannot be registered.37  Likewise, 
trademarks consisting of the name, signature or portrait of a living 
person cannot be registered without that person’s consent.38  Finally, the 
Lanham Act prohibits registration of trademarks that are merely 
descriptive, deceptively mis-descriptive, primarily geographically 
descriptive, primarily surnames, functional, or that consumers may 
confuse with other registered marks.39  
                                                           
34. Id.; Michael Baroni, Warning:  Offensive Trademarks Lie Ahead, O.C. LAWYER , 
http://www.virtualonlineeditions.com/article/Warning%3A+Offensive+Trademarks+Lie+Ahead/
2499689/0/article.html [https://perma.cc/JR33-Q879]. 
35. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1752. 
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2017). 
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(b). 
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(c) (2017).  Additionally, if the trademark is of the name, signature, 
or portrait of a deceased United States President, the markholder cannot register the mark without 
written consent of the deceased President’s widow.  Id.  
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d)–(e) (2017). 
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Section 2(a) presents additional registration obstacles.  It provides 
that trademarks comprising or consisting of “immoral, deceptive, or 
scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a 
connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national 
symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute” shall be refused 
trademark registration.40  A disparaging mark is one that “‘dishonor[s] 
by comparison with what is inferior, slight[s], deprecate[s], degrade[s], 
or affect[s] or injure[s] by unjust comparison.’”41  For example, the 
PTO has, in the past, denied trademarks for phrases like JIHADI 
KILLER and QUEER GEAR because it deemed them disparaging to 
Muslims and the LGBT community, respectively.42  
To determine whether a registrant’s mark is disparaging, the 
PTO’s trademark examiners used the following test: “(1) What is the 
likely meaning of the matter in question, . . . and (2) if that meaning is 
found to refer to identifiable persons, institutions, beliefs or national 
symbols, whether that meaning may be disparaging to a substantial 
composite of the referenced group.”43  The Lanham Act banned 
disparaging marks because the government purportedly “disapproves of 
the messages” these types of trademarks convey.”44  
Similarly, courts use a fact-based approach to determine whether a 
mark comprises scandalous or immoral matter.45  To prove that a mark 
is scandalous,  
the PTO must demonstrate that the mark is “shocking to the sense 
of truth, decency, or propriety; disgraceful; offensive; disreputable; 
                                                           
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2017). 
41. In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
42. Baroni, supra note 34; Fred Barbash, Warning:  This article on Trademarks May 
Include Language Deemed ‘Scandalous, Immoral or Disparaging’, WASH. POST  (Sept. 30, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/09/30/the-idiotic-history-
of-deeming-trademarks-scandalous-immoral-or-disparaging/?utm_term=.ea5479bc9c31 
[https://perma.cc/WA8E-VF4N]. 
43. Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 
§ 1203.03(b)(i), https://www.uspto.gov/trademark/guides-and-manuals/tmep-archives (click on 
“January 2015” under “TMEP—Archived Editions”) [https://perma.cc/2NBD-W8XB]. 
44. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1327.  
45. In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
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. . . giving offense to the conscience or moral feelings; . . . [or] 
calling out [for] condemnation.”  The PTO must consider the mark 
in the context of the marketplace as applied to only the goods 
described in [the] application for registration.46 
As with disparaging marks, “[w]hether or not the mark, including 
innuendo, is scandalous is to be ascertained from the standpoint of not 
necessarily a majority, but a substantial composite of the general 
public.”47 
III. ONE BAND’S JOURNEY TO THE TOP CHARTS AND HIGHEST COURTS 
A. The Slants: Rock n’ Roll with Purpose 
The Slants, who self-identify as “the first and only all-Asian 
American dance rock band,” have been at the center of this trademark 
registration controversy for years.48  During this time, The Slants have 
built a reputation not only as musicians, but also as advocates for their 
fellow Asian-Americans.49  Most notably, the band has made efforts to 
confront Asian-American stereotypes head-on.  The band’s mere 
existence challenges the stereotype that Asian-American musicians are 
best suited to classical music and instruments.50  To date, The Slants 
have released two albums with racially charged titles (“Slanted Eyes, 
Slanted Hearts” and “The Yellow Album”) using terms typically used to 
                                                           
46. Id. 
47. In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 485 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
48. Michelle Chen, Simon Tam on Activism, Freedom of Speech, and Strange Allies, 
HYPHEN  (Sept. 15, 2017), https://hyphenmagazine.com/blog/2017/09/simon-tam-activism-
freedom-speech-and-strange-allies [https://perma.cc/JZJ2-86P8]. 
49. See April Baer, The Slants:  Trading in Stereotypes, NPR  (June 11, 2008, 1:22 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90278746 [https://perma.cc/4FE4-L5KE]; 
Katy Steinmetz, “The Slants” Suit:  Asian-American Band Goes to Court over Name, TIME  
(Oct. 23, 2013), http://entertainment.time.com/2013/10/23/the-slants-suit-asian-american-band-
goes-to-court-over-name/ [https://perma.cc/ZLY9-DHQR]. 
50. Lisa Bernier, 11 Asian Musicians Proving that Great Music Knows No Race, MIC 
(Mar. 12, 2014), https://mic.com/articles/85035/11-asian-musicians-proving-that-great-music-
knows-no-race#.AuPLgmM1Z [https://perma.cc/3FKV-P2FX].  
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describe stereotypical Asian features and skin-tone. 51  The band’s name 
itself is a direct reference to the musicians’ Asian-American heritage.  
Band-founder Simon Tam has explained that the meaning behind the 
band’s name is trifold; it alludes to the band members’ “slant on life,” it 
refers to the slanted guitar chords used in their music, and, most 
importantly, it confronts a derogatory slang term directed toward 
Asians.52   
Use of the word “slant” as a derogatory term toward Asian-
Americans has been recorded as early as 1943.53  It was this derogatory 
usage of the term that led the PTO to deny trademark registration to the 
band in December 2012 on the grounds that it was disparaging to 
persons of Asian descent at the time of registration.54 
B. Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Finds Section 2(a) 
Constitutional 
Following the PTO’s initial denial of trademark for THE 
SLANTS, Tam appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 
(TTAB).55  In its appeal, Tam clarified the band’s purpose in using the 
term “slant” as a commentary on Asian-American stereotypes and 
further questioned section 2(a)’s ban on disparaging marks.56  In 2013, 
the TTAB upheld the PTO’s refusal to register THE SLANTS.57  In its 
opinion, the TTAB held that despite Tam’s intent to reclaim the term 
“slant,” the meaning was nonetheless “a highly disparaging reference to 
people of Asian descent.”58  Furthermore, the board held that section 
2(a) of the Lanham Act was immune from First Amendment strict 
                                                           
51. Discography, THE SLANTS, http://www.theslants.com/discography/ [https://perma.cc/ 
K84L-ZAFW]. 
52. In re Tam, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d 1305, at *1305 (T.T.A.B. 2013); Steinmetz, supra note 49. 
53. Slant, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/slant?s=t [https://perma. 
cc/HK7B-W9V2].  
54. In re Tam, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d at *1305. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 1307. 
58. Id. 
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scrutiny because Tam could still use the band name in commerce.59  In 
other words, because Tam was not forbidden from using “The Slants” 
as his band name, speech was not so restricted for section 2(a) to 
undergo strict scrutiny evaluation.60  
C. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Overturns the TTAB 
Tam appealed the TTAB’s decision to the Federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals.61  At first, the court affirmed the TTAB’s decision, finding 
evidence that THE SLANTS is “likely offensive to a substantial 
composite of people of Asian descent.”62  Then, in late 2015, the court, 
sitting en banc, reversed the TTAB’s holding and remanded the case to 
the board for further proceedings.63  In its decision, the court held that 
the Lanham Act is not immune to First Amendment strict scrutiny, and 
that registration under the Lanham Act does not qualify as government 
speech and cannot be considered a government subsidy.64  This 
decision, which focused solely on the disparaging-marks segment of 
section 2(a), effectively deemed the disparagement proscription 
unconstitutional.65  
According to the court, section 2(a)’s ban on disparaging marks is 
antithetical to the policy behind the Lanham Act—the ban fails to 
prevent consumer confusion or deceit, and it does not protect certain 
                                                           
59. Id. at 1313. 
60. Id. at 1309.  Strict scrutiny evaluation is the strictest standard of review employed in 
cases alleging a constitutional violation.  Among other questions, strict scrutiny analysis asks 
whether the government interest is compelling, and, if so, whether the law is narrowly tailored 
enough to achieve that government interest.  See Roy G. Space & David Yokum, Scrutinizing 
Strict Scrutiny, 40 VT. L. REV. 285, 293–98 (2015). As compared to its counterparts—
intermediate scrutiny and rational basis scrutiny—strict scrutiny is the hardest to survive. The 
TTAB’s designation of section 2(a) as not deserving strict scrutiny, therefore, made it more likely 
that the statute would be found constitutional.  
61. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
62. In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 571 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
63. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1328.  
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
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markholders’ investment in their marks.66  Rather, the ban denies “the 
protections of registration for reasons quite separate from any ability of 
the mark to serve the consumer and investment interests underlying 
trademark protection.”67   
In striking down section 2(a) as unconstitutional, the court first 
determined that the disparagement clause discriminates on the basis of 
both content and viewpoint.68  Specifically, it held that section 2(a) 
discriminates on the basis of content in the sense that it “‘applies to 
particular speech because of the topic discussed.’”69  It further held that 
when “[t]he PTO rejects marks under section 2(a) when it finds the 
marks refer to a group in a negative way, but . . . permits the registration 
of marks that refer to a group in a positive, non-disparaging manner[,] 
[s]ection 2(a) . . . discriminates on the basis of viewpoint.”70  Because it 
involves content and viewpoint discrimination, the court explained, 
section 2(a) is subject to strict scrutiny.71  And as a restriction that 
denies trademark registration solely based on the disparaging message 
that a mark is perceived to convey, the court concluded that section 2(a) 
fails strict scrutiny analysis.72   
The court underscored its conclusion by observing section 2(a)’s 
financial effect on markholders.73  “[T]he Government offends the First 
Amendment when it imposes financial burdens on certain speakers 
based on the content of their expression.”74  Federally registering a 
                                                           
66. Id. at 1329–30. 
67. Id. at 1329. 
68. Id. at 1335.  
69. Id. (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015)).   
70. Id. at 1336. 
71. Id. at 1334, 1337 (explaining that “[s]trict scrutiny is used to review any governmental 
regulation that burdens private speech based on disapproval of the message conveyed,” and 
holding that strict scrutiny applies to and invalidates “[c]ontent-based laws—those that target 
speech based on its communicative content.”). 
72. Id. at 1337. 
73. Id. at 1340–41. 
74. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995). 
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trademark provides a markholder with a valuable “asset”75 that confers 
significant financial benefits.76  By preventing markholders from 
federally registering marks that are determined to be disparaging, 
section 2(a) effectively “burdens some speakers and benefits others.”77  
The court rejected the government’s argument that strict scrutiny 
does not apply because trademark registration qualifies as government 
speech.78  Rather, the court held that by registering a trademark, the 
PTO is regulating private speech.79   
When the Government registers a trademark, the only message it 
conveys is that a mark is registered.  The vast array of private 
trademarks are not created . . . , owned[,] . . . monopolized . . . , [or] 
sized and formatted by the Government, . . . understood as 
performing any Government function . . . , aligned with the 
Government, or . . . used as a platform for Government speech.80   
According to the court, consumers do not equate federal 
registration of a mark with government approval of that mark,81 and the 
PTO itself clarified that the office “does not endorse any particular 
product, service, mark, or registrant” when it approves a mark for 
federal registration.82  Instead, the court equated trademark registration 
with more mundane government authorizations such as street parade 
                                                           
75. Id. at 1340. 
76. Lee Ann W. Lockridge, Abolishing State Trademark Registrations, 29 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 597, 605 (2011); see also B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 135 S. Ct. 
1293, 1300 (2015); Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 199–200 (1985) 
(listing advantages of federal trademark registration, including constructive notice of a 
registrant’s ownership claim over a mark, a markholder’s exclusive right to use the registered 
mark, and a trademark’s incontestability after a five-year period).  
77. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1340. 
78. Id. at 1345. 
79. Id. at 1348. 
80. Id. at 1346. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 1347. 
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permits, copyright registration certificates, or hunting licenses.83  The 
court further reasoned that even if the PTO had granted trademark 
registration to THE SLANTS, the general public would likely not have 
interpreted the registration as the government’s endorsement of the 
band.84  
Strict scrutiny also applies because trademark registration does not 
amount to a government subsidy.85  According to the court, the 
government does not send a message of any kind to the public when it 
approves registration of a trademark.86  “[T]he Lanham Act derives 
from the Commerce Clause, not the Spending Clause,”87 because it does 
not confer any direct monetary benefits to registrants.88  Taxpayers do 
not fund trademark registration.89  Instead, markholders’ “registration 
fees cover all of the operating expenses associated with registering 
marks.”90  
The court concluded that because section 2(a)’s disparagement 
provision does not pass strict scrutiny, it is unconstitutional under the 
First Amendment.91  The majority acknowledged that its decision “may 
lead to the wider registration of marks that offend vulnerable 
communities.”92  It noted, however, that allowing for and “tolerat[ing] 
                                                           
83. Id. at 1347–48. 
84. Id. at 1347. 
85. Id. at 1348-49. 
86. Id. at 1351. 
87. Id. at 1354. 
88. Id. at 1353. 
89. Id.  
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 1358.  
92. Id. at 1357–58. 
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insulting and . . . outrageous speech”93 is crucial to preserving “the 
freedoms protected by the First Amendment.”94  
D. The Alternative Response to Constitutionality:  
Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc. 
In their fight for trademark registration, The Slants found an 
unlikely and controversial ally in an NFL football team: the Washington 
Redskins.  Although the Redskins have owned their trademarks for 
decades, the team’s battle with the PTO began around the same time as 
The Slants.’  Their stories are interwoven.  
The Redskins first registered the Redskins trademarks in 1967.95  
Almost fifty years later, in June 2014, the TTAB cancelled the team’s 
trademarks under the section 2(a) disparagement ban in Pro-Football, 
Inc. v. Blackhorse.96  The TTAB reasoned that “at the time of their 
registrations[,] the marks consisted of matter that both ‘may disparage’ 
a substantial composite of Native Americans and bring them into 
contempt or disrepute.”97  Over the years, in addition to using the term 
“redskins,” “the team has consistently associated itself with Native 
American imagery.”98  It has used logos of a Native American man and 
spears, Native American headdresses, traditional Native American 
clothing, and black braided-hair wigs for the team’s marching band and 
cheerleaders.99  
                                                           
93. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988).  
94. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011).  
95. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 448 (E.D. Va. 2015). 
96. Pro-Football, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 451.  Note, however, that “the cancellation of 
the Redskins trademark has never gone into effect.  Under federal law, that only happens after the 
Redskins unsuccessfully exhaust all of their appeals.  As a consequence, the Redskins have 
maintained all of the benefits of federal trademark registration during the controversy.”  Michael 
McCann, Why the Redskins Scored a Victory in the Supreme Court’s Ruling in Favor of The 
Slants, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jun. 19, 2017), https://www.si.com/nfl/2017/06/19/washington-
redskins-name-slants-trademark-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/Q2AE-M7D2].  
97. Pro-Football, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 451 (citation omitted). 
98. Id. at 469–70. 
99. Id. 
BEHNAM 3/22/2018  8:00 PM 
16 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1 
In July 2015, the Eastern District Court of Virginia affirmed the 
TTAB’s decision in Pro-Football and upheld the constitutionality of the 
Lanham Act’s disparagement ban.100  Months later, the Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeals reached the opposite conclusion in In re Tam.101  
Following its defeat in the Eastern District Court of Virgina, respondent 
Pro-Football appealed and asked the Fourth Circuit to postpone oral 
argument until after the Supreme Court delivered its decision in Lee v. 
Tam.102  Between the In re Tam decision and the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Matal v. Tam (formerly Lee v. Tam), “[t]he PTO . . . halted the 
processing of all trademark applications raising disparagement issues, 
including Tam’s.”103  
E. The Supreme Court Weighs in on Disparagement, Once and for All 
On September 29, 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Lee v. Shiao Tam;104  its eight members heard oral arguments on the 
matter on January 18, 2017.105  In a June 19, 2017, plurality opinion, the 
Court unanimously struck down the Lanham Act’s disparagement 
clause as unconstitutional.106 
                                                           
100. Id. at 465. 
101. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1328. 
102. Joanna Diakos & Thomas W. Dollar, Trademark Law Update:  SCOTUS to Decide 
Whether Ban on Registering ‘Disparaging Marks’ Is Unconstitutional, NAT’L L.J. REV. (Nov. 8, 
2016), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/trademark-law-update-scotus-to-decide-whether-
ban-registering-disparaging-marks [https://perma.cc/MU69-3ERY]; see also Brief for Pro-
Football, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 3, Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016) 
(No. 15-1293). 
103. Band Front Man Asks U.S. High Court to Consider Trademark Disparagement, 17-
11 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. TRADEMARKS (2016).  
104. Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016), cert. granted, (No. 174, 2016 Term). 
105. Oral Argument, Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016) (No. 15-1293), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2016/15-1293 [https://perma.cc/Q49X-
A9SU]; see also Marcia Coyle & Tony Mauro, Gorsuch’s SCOTUS Vote Could Soon Prove 
Decisive on Many Cases; Senate Confirms Gorsuch 54–45 to Fill Scalia Vacancy, NAT’L L.J. 
REV. (Apr. 7, 2017), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202783207725/Gorsuchs -
SCOTUS-Vote-Could-Soon-Prove-Decisive-on-Many-Cases?slreturn=20170906141452 
[https://perma.cc/4LX9-SRUN]. 
106. See generally Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).  Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Breyer and Kennedy joined Justice Alito’s opinion, while Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, 
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First, the Court held that “the disparagement clause applies to 
marks that disparage the members of a racial or ethnic group,” and not 
merely to natural or juristic persons as Tam had initially contended.107  
In affirming the Federal Circuit’s determination that the disparagement 
clause violates the First Amendment, the Court held that trademarks are 
private speech and not a form of government speech, subsidy, or 
program.108 
In finding that trademarks do not constitute government speech, 
the Court noted that the federal government neither creates nor edits 
registered trademarks.109  It reasoned that if trademarks were in fact 
government speech, then the federal government would be “babbling 
prodigiously and incoherently,” saying “unseemly things,” “expressing 
contradictory views,” and “endorsing a vast array of commercial 
products and services.”110 
Moreover, the Court noted that none of its previous decisions 
involving government speech contended that trademarks are a form of 
government speech.111  Trademarks are unlike monuments, for instance, 
which governments have used “to speak to the public since ancient 
times.”112  And private speech cannot be “passed off as government 
speech by simply affixing a government seal of approval”; if the 
government were allowed to do so, it would have free rein to “silence or 
muffle the expression of disfavored viewpoints.”113  
                                                           
and Kagan joined Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.  This article’s analysis of that case focuses on 
Justice Alito’s opinion. 
107. Id. at 1757. 
108. Id. at 1757–64. 
109. Id. at 1758. 
110. Id. at 1758–59 (asking rhetorically:  “If trademarks represent government speech, 
what does the Government have in mind when it advises Americans to ‘make.believe’ (Sony), 
‘Think different’ (Apple), ‘Just do it’ (Nike), or ‘Have it your way’ (Burger King)?  Was the 
Government warning about a coming disaster when it registered the mark ‘EndTime 
Ministries’?”) (internal footnotes omitted). 
111. Id. at 1759.  
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 1758.. 
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Next, the Court determined that trademark registration does not 
equate to a government subsidy.114  “The PTO does not pay money to 
parties seeking registration of a mark,” but rather, the applicant pays the 
PTO an initial registration fee plus additional fees to maintain its mark 
over time.115  The use of government funds in examining and publishing 
marks does not mean that trademark registration is therefore a 
government subsidy, as “just about every government service requires 
the expenditure of government funds.”116  
The Court also refuted the government’s attempt to retain the 
disparagement clause as a type of government program.117  Though 
“some content- and speaker-based restrictions may be allowed” “[w]hen 
government creates . . . a forum, in either a literal or ‘metaphysical’ 
sense,” viewpoint discrimination, such as that found under section 
2(a)’s disparagement clause, is still forbidden.118  Thus, the Court 
reaffirmed the long-standing rule that “‘the public expression of ideas 
may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves 
offensive to some of their hearers.’”119  
Finally, the Court held that the disparagement clause “cannot 
withstand even Central Hudson review.”120  In other words, the Lanham 
Act’s restrictions on disparaging trademarks do not serve a substantial 
interest and are not narrowly drawn.121  Although the government 
argued “an interest in preventing ‘underrepresented groups’ from being 
                                                           
114. Id. at 1761 (dismissing as inapplicable the notion that “government is not required to 
subsidize activities that it does not wish to promote”).  
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 1763. 
119. Id. (citing Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)). 
120. Id. at 1764.  The government also argued an interest in “protecting the orderly flow 
of commerce.”  Id.  In rejecting this argument, the Court noted that “the disparagement clause is 
not ‘narrowly drawn’ to drive out trademarks that support invidious discrimination.”  Id. at 1764–
65.  Instead, “[t]he clause reaches any trademark that disparages any person, group, or 
institution.”  Id. at 1765.  Thus, “[i]t is not an anti-discrimination clause; it is a happy-talk clause” 
that “goes much further than is necessary to serve the interest asserted.”  Id. 
121. Id. at 1764. 
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‘bombarded with demeaning messages in commercial advertising,” the 
Court stressed that one of the government’s most critical responsibilities 
is to protect the First Amendment.122  “Speech that demeans on the basis 
of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar 
ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free speech 
jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that 
we hate.’”123 
IV. LOOKING TO THE PAST AND THE FUTURE: EXAMINING THE PTO’S 
MISSTEPS AND EXPLORINJG WHAT MATAL V. TAM SIGNIFIES FOR SECTION 
2(A) OF THE LANHAM ACT 
Although section 2(a)’s language has yet to be updated, in the 
wake of Matal v. Tam, the PTO may no longer refuse trademark 
registration solely because it deems a mark disparaging.124  
Nevertheless, the Matal v. Tam decision was limited to section 2(a)’s 
ban on disparaging marks; it did not address section 2(a)’s remaining 
provisions, including its ban on immoral and scandalous marks.125  
Given the Court’s narrow ruling, the question now is whether these 
provisions will also be deemed unconstitutional. 
We may have the answer before long.  In 2011, streetwear fashion 
designer Erik Brunetti attempted to trademark the term FUCT for his 
company Fuct Manufacturing Co.126  The PTO denied Brunetti’s 
application because it contained “‘vulgar, profane and scandalous 
slang’” (i.e., an immoral and scandalous mark), and the TTAB affirmed 
that decision in August 2014.127  “Brunetti appealed to the Federal 
Circuit, arguing that the Lanham Act’s prohibition on scandalous marks 
violates the First Amendment,” but “[t]he court stayed the case while 
                                                           
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. See Patrick H.J. Hughes, PTO Updates Trademark Examiners’ Guide to Reflect 
‘Slants’ Decision, Westlaw Intellectual Prop. Daily Briefing, June 29, 2017, at 1, 2017 WL 
2804035 (summarizing how the PTO plans to comply with the Matal Court’s decision).). 
125. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017). 
126. In re Brunetti, 2014 WL 3976439, at *1–2 (T.T.A.B. 2014). 
127. Id. at *1, *3 (reasoning that “the term ‘Fuct’ is the phonetic equivalent of the word 
‘Fucked,’ the past tense form of the verb ‘fuck’”).  
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the Supreme Court heard Matal v. Tam.”128  Following the Matal 
holding, the Federal Circuit ordered the In re Brunetti parties to submit 
supplemental briefs “explaining how the constitutionality of the 
immoral and scandalous provision should be resolved in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision.”129  
In striking down section 2(a)’s disparagement clause as 
unconstitutional, the Matal Court upheld the spirit of the First 
Amendment, invalidated an arbitrarily applied ban, and supported 
trademark registration’s underlying policy.130  With In re Brunetti, the 
Federal Circuit Court has the opportunity to do the same.131  This 
section explores the negative impact section 2(a) had on the Lanham 
Act’s clarity, efficacy, and goals prior to Matal v. Tam, why allowing 
trademark registration of disparaging, immoral, and scandalous marks 
will likely not create a sudden influx of those marks, and how Matal v. 
Tam may affect section 2(a)’s ban on immoral and scandalous marks in 
the near future.  
A. Section 2(a)’s Vagueness Creates Uncertainty for  
Markholders and Consumers. 
An examination of section 2(a) reveals a statute that is 
inconsistent, unpredictable, and contradictory.  Section 2(a)’s vague 
nature allows the PTO’s trademark examiners to subjectively determine 
whether an applicant’s marks are disparaging.  In the United States, 
vague laws are prohibited for two reasons: First, “regulated parties 
should know what is required of them so they may act accordingly.”132  
Second, “precision and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing 
the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way.”133  Yet, a close 
                                                           
128. Jan Wolfe, Court Likely to Lift Ban on Vulgar Trademarks After ‘Slants’ Ruling, 24 
WESTLAW J. INTELLECTUAL PROP. 1, 8 (2017). 
129. Jennifer Ko Craft, Why High Court Is Right About Offensive Trademarks, LAW 360 
(June 28, 2017, 5:18 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/939421/why-high-court-is-right-
about-offensive-trademarks [https://perma.cc/GG4R-DLLZ].  
130. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1744.  
131. See generally In re Brunetti, 2014 WL 3976439. 
132. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012). 
133. Id. 
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examination of the PTO’s track record reveals that the office had no 
history of uniformly registering or rejecting similar marks.134  To the 
contrary, “[t]he PTO often decides, in [a] contradictory manner, whose 
speech gets the ‘privilege’ of a registered trademark . . . [a]nd whose 
doesn’t.”135  For instance, looking at generally similar marks, the PTO 
granted registration for the trademark JIHAD WATCH, but refused 
registration for the trademark JEW WATCH; granted registration for 
the trademark EVILCHRISTIANS, but denied registration for the mark 
STOP ISLAMISATION OF AMERICA; and accepted the mark THE 
DEVIL IS A DEMOCRAT, while rejecting the mark HAVE YOU 
HEARD SATAN IS A REPUBLICAN.136 
Even more egregiously, the PTO often treated “identical terms 
differently.”137  For instance, “[t]he PTO has registered FAGDOG on 
some occasions, and on other occasions has found FAGDOG 
disparaging.”138  And, although it denied the mark HEEB under section 
2(a) for being disparaging toward Jews, HEBE, the alternative spelling 
of the word, is registered.139  
Most relevant to the PTO’s prior rejection of THE SLANTS are 
the marks that have been registered to other bands that bear terms 
offensive based on race and gender.  In the past, the PTO has registered 
the trademark WHITE TRASH COWBOYS for an all-white rock band 
as well as N.W.A., an abbreviation for “Niggaz With Attitude,” for an 
all-black rap group.140  The PTO’s inconsistent approach to evaluating 
                                                           
134. Michael Baroni, Warning:  Offensive Trademarks Lie Ahead , OC LAWYER, 
http://www.virtualonlineeditions.com/article/Warning%3A+Offensive+Trademarks+Lie+Ahead/
2499689/0/article.html [https://perma.cc/JR33-Q879]. 
135. Id. 
136. Id.; see generally In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Brief for Respondent 
at 54 Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016) (No. 15-1293).). 
137. Brief for Pro-Football, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 13, Lee v. 
Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016) (No. 15-1293).  
138. Brief for Respondent, supra note 136, at 54. 
139. Emily M. Kustina, Comment, Discriminatory Discretion:  PTO Procedures and 
Viewpoint Discrimination under Section 2(A) of the Lanham Act, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 513, 527 
(2016). 
140. Brief for Pro-Football, Inc., supra note 137, at 10. 
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disparaging marks continued even amidst its litigation with Tam; after 
the PTO rejected THE SLANTS, it registered the mark REFORMED 
WHORES to a female comedy band.141 
As discussed in Section II, supra, prior to Matal, PTO trademark 
examiners were instructed to ask two questions when determining 
whether a registrant’s mark was disparaging: “(1) What is the likely 
meaning of the matter in question, . . . and (2) if that meaning is found 
to refer to identifiable persons, institutions, beliefs or national symbols, 
whether that meaning may be disparaging to a substantial composite of 
the referenced group.”142  This two-prong test provided little guidance 
on how to determine whether a mark was disparaging.  As a result, the 
PTO’s trademark examiners granted and denied registration based on 
their “subjective whims.”143  Although trademark examiners were meant 
to exercise a policy of deference toward applicants in determining 
section 2(a) compliance,144 “analysis of the actual procedures 
undertaken by examiners reveals that deference [was] employed in 
name only, with examiners substituting their own discretionary 
judgment of . . . disparagement for that of the public or disparaged 
group.”145  
The subjective test the PTO used was not limited to a trademark 
examiner’s literal evaluation of a mark.  In making their decisions, the 
PTO’s trademark examiners often looked beyond the potentially 
disparaging term and paid careful attention to the registrant’s identity 
and his or her purpose for using the mark.146  For example, a non-profit, 
                                                           
141. Id.  
142. Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK 
OFFICE § 1203.03(b)(i), https://www.uspto.gov/trademark/guides-and-manuals/tmep-archives 
(click on “January 2015” under “TMEP—Archived Editions”) [https://perma.cc/2NBD-W8XB]. 
143. Baroni, supra note 134. 
144. Kustina, supra note 139, at 519 (explaining that “[a]ccording to the TTAB and the 
courts, the PTO is supposed to resolve any doubts as to the disparaging or scandalous nature of a 
mark in favor of the applicant and then allow for opposition proceedings to assess any section 
2(a) issues before the mark is registered on the Principal Register”).  
145. Id. at 520.  
146. See, e.g., In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Joe Garofoli, 
Attorneys Find Dykes on Bikes Patently Offensive, Reject Name, S.F. GATE  (July 14, 2005, 4:00 
AM), http://www.sfgate.com/politics/joegarofoli/article/Attorneys-find-Dykes-on-Bikes-patently-
offensive-2655626.php [https://perma.cc/JR33-Q879]. 
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pro-LGBT group was repeatedly refused registration of its trademark 
DYKES ON BIKES until the markholder could show that “the term was 
often enough used with pride” among the LGBT community.147  “Thus, 
an applicant [could] register a mark if he shows it is perceived by the 
referenced group in a positive way, even if the mark contains language 
that would be offensive in another context.”148  Not only was this 
confusing, it was also illogical: the referenced group’s positive 
perception of a mark does not eliminate its disparaging history. 
This dependency on the trademark examiner’s understanding of 
words or phrases for which registration was sought left markholders 
vulnerable at the time of registration and beyond. Without a readily 
identifiable and predictable standard, applicants with a potentially 
disparaging mark had no way of knowing whether their mark would 
pass the PTO’s subjective and varied standards.149  Additionally, the 
conflicting applications of section 2(a)’s provision reveal that the PTO 
was not merely considering the words, phrases, or images used; it was 
also considering who the markholder was, what the mark was 
representing, and how society perceived the mark at the time of 
application.150 
Moreover, under that system, a markholder with a potentially 
disparaging mark could never feel fully secure in his or her trademark 
registration.151  “Even if an applicant obtain[ed] a registration initially, 
the mark [could] be challenged in a cancellation proceeding years 
later.”152  This is precisely what occurred in Pro-Football, where the 
team registered (and renewed) six Redskins-related marks between the 
years 1967 and 1990, only to have the TTAB cancel those registrations 
in 2014.153  “Thus, after years of investment in promoting a registered 
                                                           
147. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1337; see generally Garofoli, supra, note 146. 
148. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1337.  
149. Id. at 1342–43.  
150. Lisa P. Ramsey, A Free Speech Right to Trademark Protection?, 106 TRADEMARK 
REPORTER 797, 808 (2016); see also Baroni, supra note 134. 
151. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1342–43.  
152. Id.  
153. Brief for Pro-Football, Inc., supra note 137, at 1. 
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mark and coming to be known by it,” markholders, like the Redskins, 
were perpetually at risk of their marks being cancelled.154  The 
cancellation of a mark years after registration exposed that mark to 
extreme market vulnerability,155 forcing “the mark’s owner to find a 
new mark and make substantial new investments in educating the 
public, . . . and . . . establishing recognition of the new mark.”156 
Similar marks, like disparaging marks, have also been treated 
differently under section 2(a)’s tests.  For instance, although the PTO 
published marks for TWATTY and TWATTYTRAX, the PTO later 
rejected the mark TWATTYGIRL on immoral or scandalous 
grounds.157  “The trademark MILF has been approved 23 times, but 
refused 20 times.  Marks including each of the following have been both 
approved and refused: ANAL, ASS, BITCH, COCK, POTHEAD, 
SHIT, SLUT, WHORE.”158  
Unlike with disparaging and similar marks, the PTO has applied its 
standard for denying scandalous and immoral marks fairly consistently.  
The PTO’s determination of which marks are scandalous or immoral, 
like with disparaging marks, “is largely subjective because of a lack of 
defined legislative intent and the PTO’s failure to specifically articulate 
standards for applying these bars to registration.”159  As mentioned in 
Section II, supra, to prove that a mark is scandalous,  
the PTO must demonstrate that the mark is “shocking to the sense 
of truth, decency, or propriety; disgraceful; offensive; disreputable; 
. . . giving offense to the conscience or moral feelings; . . . [or] 
                                                           
154. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1343.  
155. See Michelle B. Lee, Section 2(A) of the Lanham Act as a Restriction on Sports 
Team Names:  Has Political Correctness Gone too Far?, 4 SPORTS L.J.  65, 68–69 (1997) 
(explaining that “individuals who argue for the cancellation of the registration of team names 
have said they want the registrations canceled so that the value of the trademarks will be so 
dramatically reduced that the owners will voluntarily cancel the marks”). 
156. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1342–43.  
157. In re Ava Watkins, 2005 WL 548042, at *1 (T.T.A.B. 2005); Kustina, supra note 
139, at 521. 
158. Brief for Erik Brunetti as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff, Lee v. Tam, 137 S. 
Ct. 30 (2016) (No. 15-1293).  
159. Kustina, supra note 139, at 516. 
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calling out [for] condemnation.”  The PTO must consider the mark 
in the context of the marketplace as applied to only the goods 
described in [the] application for registration.160 
Yet, here the PTO has applied this standard consistently: “In the 
scandalousness context, the most ‘vulgar’ words were denied 
registration most frequently and most consistently.”161  Terms like 
“‘[f]uck’ and ‘asshole’ received no registrations whatsoever, and . . . 
[v]ery few marks using ‘shit’ were granted.”162   
One explanation for these varied outcomes may be that trademark 
examiners find it easier to collect evidence of scandalousness than of 
disparagement.  “For scandalousness, most examiners rely on dictionary 
definitions that deem the word to be offensive, vulgar, profane, or 
scandalous to support a section 2(a) determination.”163  For 
disparagement, however, dictionary definitions and internet searches are 
considered “lower-quality, less-reliable information” and “the PTO 
lacks the resources to assemble high-quality evidence[—]such as 
surveys, personal affidavits, petitions, and expert linguistic analysis[—
]to assess” the public’s actual perception.164 
B. Section 2(a) Conflicts with Basic First Amendment Rights. 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Matal—that section 2(a)’s 
disparagement clause is unconstitutional—is aligned with our national 
interest in unimpeded freedom of speech.  Although the government 
does not always approve of messages conveyed in public debate, it 
permits citizens to use deprecating and degrading language, if they so 
choose, with little to no restrictions.165  These permissions, referred to as 
                                                           
160. In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
161. Kustina, supra note 139, at 526. 
162. Id. at 527.  
163. Id. at 528. 
164. Id. at 521. 
165. See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that “[a]s a general 
matter, the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it.  
Speech that is called hateful, or speech that is unpopular, or speech with which you strongly 
disagree, may still be protected speech.  The Government, including the courts, can place 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on how protected speech may be expressed.  
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the “breathing space” afforded by the First Amendment,166 illustrate the 
government’s long-standing dedication “to protect[ing] even hurtful 
speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.”167   
It is well established that “speech cannot be restricted simply 
because it is upsetting.”168  In Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court held 
that the Westboro Baptist Church’s picketing of a soldier’s funeral with 
hurtful signs and slogans was constitutionally protected speech.169  
Some of those signs, such as “Fag troops,” “God hates fags,” and “Fags 
doom nations,” used the exact type of language prohibited under section 
2(a)’s disparagement ban.170  Markholders who choose to use similarly 
disparaging marks have now been granted the same protection in the 
form of federal trademark registration, a protection that, logically, 
should be extended to scandalous and immoral marks.  The “few 
categories of speech that the government can regulate or punish—for 
instance, fraud, defamation, or incitement—are well established within 
our constitutional tradition.”171  Scandalous and immoral marks, like 
disparaging marks, do not fall into these categories.  Trademarks, which 
are created, promoted, and funded by the markholder,172 should not 
receive differential treatment simply because the PTO must approve 
them prior to registration.  Allowing federal registration of potentially 
disparaging, scandalous, and immoral trademarks both protects and is 
mandated by the First Amendment.  
                                                           
These restrictions must be narrowly tailored, and should balance the interests of all the people 
involved”).  
166. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988).  
167. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460–61 (2011).  
168. Id. at 458; see also Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 798 (2011) 
(holding that “disgust is not a valid basis for restricting expression”).  
169. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 463.  
170. Id. at 448.  
171. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1765. 
172. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1353 (explaining that “since 1991 [PTO] appropriations have 
been funded entirely by [trademark] registration fees, not the taxpayer”). 
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C. Section 2(a) Contravenes Federal Trademark Law’s Objectives. 
Section 2(a)’s ban on disparaging, immoral, and scandalous 
trademarks also undermines the trademark system’s purpose.  The 
Lanham Act’s other restrictions support trademark protection’s public 
policy; they limit markholders from registering marks likely to “cause 
confusion . . . mistake . . . or to deceive,”173 as well as marks that are 
“deceptively misdescriptive.”174  Viewed under a policy lens, section 
2(a)—with its “hodgepodge of restrictions”—is out of place.175  In fact, 
section 2(a)’s restrictions directly conflict with Lanham Act’s 
objectives.176  By allowing the PTO to revoke a mark’s protection 
whenever it deems it offensive, section 2(a) can be used to injure a 
markholder after he or she “has invested millions of dollars protecting 
its brand identity and consumers have come to rely on the mark as a 
brand identifier.”177  
By denying trademark protection to The Slants from December 
2012 to June 2017, the Lanham Act imposed a heavy burden on the 
band—it restricted Tam’s sole claim to the band name, as evidenced by 
“other bands [that] have named themselves The Slants.”178  This hurt the 
band in two ways: it negatively affected them financially, and it led to 
consumer confusion. 
First, other bands’ ability to freely name themselves “The Slants” 
greatly restricted Tam’s financial earnings.179  Without federal 
trademark protection, Tam and his band could not fully benefit from the 
mark they spent years cultivating.  Instead, others using the mark 
                                                           
173. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2017). 
174. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2017); In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1329. 
175. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1329. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 1330. 
178. Ian Shapira, The Slants and the Redskins:  ‘We Are Unlikely Allies,’ Band’s Founder 
Says, WASH. POST  (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/the-slants-and-the-
redskins-we-are-unlikely-allies-the-bands-founder-says/2015/12/23/a16c3ce4-a9b8-11e5-9b92-
dea7cd4b1a4d_story.html [https://perma.cc/64T4-FU5W]. 
179. P. Sean Morris, The Economics of Distinctiveness:  The Road to Monopolization in 
Trade Mark Law, 33 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.  321, 323 (2011). 
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profited from Tam’s “sweat-of-the-brow,”180 contravening the Lanham 
Act’s purpose and placing a financial burden on the markholder.181  This 
financial burden, itself a form of speech suppression182 and offensive to 
the First Amendment,183 is magnified by a markholder’s limited 
protections under the common law.  And “[w]ithout the recognition of 
nationwide constructive use conferred by federal registration, a 
competitor can swoop in and adopt the same mark for the same goods in 
a different location.”184  Likewise, Tam and The Slants were also 
prevented from stopping “importation of goods bearing [the band’s] 
mark,” and could not “recover treble damages for willful 
infringement.”185  
Second, the lack of absolute trademark protection afforded to The 
Slants prior to June 2017 led to consumer confusion.  Congress created 
the Lanham Act, in large part, to protect “the consuming public from 
deception.”186  Yet, here the PTO’s refusal to register “The Slants” 
caused consumer confusion and lead to public deception.  For instance, 
the existence of another band named The Slants resulted in fans 
mistakenly buying concert tickets under the false impression that they 
were going to see Tam’s band.187  These mistakes were the direct result 
of confusion and deception caused by section 2(a)’s disparagement 
ban.188  Ultimately, the ban enabled the exact behavior it was designed 
                                                           
180. “Sweat of the Brow” is an intellectual property law doctrine that first appeared in 
copyright cases.  The “underlying notion” behind the term was “that copyright was a reward for 
the hard work that went into compiling facts.”  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 
U.S. 340, 352 (1991). 
181. S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946). 
182. Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 106 (3d Cir. 2004). 
183. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995). 
184. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1343. 
185. Id. 
186. Lynda J. Oswald, Challenging the Registration of Scandalous and Disparaging 
Marks Under the Lanham Act:  Who Has Standing to Sue?, 41 AM. BUS. L. J. 251, 257 (2004).  
187. Shapira, supra note 178. 
188. Id. 
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to deter: the misappropriation of Tam’s mark and the confusion and 
deception of his fans.189 
D. Eliminating Section 2(a) Will Not Create a Sudden Influx of 
Disparaging, Scandalous, or Immoral Trademarks. 
Proponents of section 2(a)’s disparagement provision maintained 
that without the ban, the federal government would “affirmatively 
promote the use of racial slurs and other disparaging terms.”190  
However, the Lanham Act’s previous blanket ban on disparaging, 
scandalous, and immoral marks is not the only means for preventing 
distasteful trademarks; other methods are available to minimize the 
number of potentially disparaging and scandalous trademarks 
registered. 
Even after the Supreme Court struck down section 2(a)’s 
disparagement ban as unconstitutional, the PTO still faces little danger 
of bombardment by an influx of disparaging trademark applications.  
While it is true that pre-existing disparaging marks can now receive 
registration, and that many new marks that would have previously been 
rejected as disparaging can now be registered,191 the uncertainty and 
concern over the effects of the Supreme Court’s holding is likely 
unfounded.  On a day-to day-basis, the average person faces a low 
number of unregistered disparaging marks.192  The United States, as a 
nation, continues to be defined by its traditional and conservative 
values.193  As a result, businesses and individuals have learned that it is 
                                                           
189. Id. 
190. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (No. 15-1293) at *10. 
191. Why You Should Give A $*%! about Words that Offend, NPR (May 13, 2013, 5:20 
AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/05/13/180811135/why-you-should-give-a-about-words-that-
offend [https://perma.cc/VP6J-V59D]. 
192. In the United States, consumers can still find goods and services with immoral, 
scandalous, or disparaging names.  For instance, customers can get their doors trimmed at 
Beaver’s Trim Shop in Texas, can purchase lumber from Dykes Lumber Company in New Jersey, 
and hire a handyman through LP Coplete Hoe Repair in New York. Though perhaps not named in 
good taste, names like these are scarce and carry a connection to the owner or the type of good or 
service provided by the company.  John Boitnott, 15 of the Worst Business Names in History, 
INC. (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.inc.com/john-boitnott/15-of-the-worst-business-names-in-
history.html [https://perma.cc/3GFM-E5RD]. 
193. See generally The American-Western European Values Gap, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/11/17/the-american-western-european-
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generally good practice to lean toward neutral or positive 
representations when selecting names, images, and sounds for their 
marketed goods and services.194  Fear of unease, contempt, and even 
boycott drives most markholders to shy away from selecting and 
promoting negative and disparaging trademarks.195  Matal v. Tam’s 
effective removal of section 2(a)’s ban on disparaging trademarks is 
unlikely to change this fundamental business practice.  
By prohibiting the PTO from rejecting marks solely on the basis of 
disparagement, the Court eliminated the government’s means of 
“disapprov[ing] of the messages conveyed by disparaging marks.”196  
However, given our nation’s continued sensitivity to certain words and 
images,197 the court of public opinion will likely assume section 2(a)’s 
previous role.  Because consumers possess great purchasing power, they 
can, in a sense, regulate the number of registered disparaging 
trademarks used.198  Even minority groups and those potentially 
                                                           
values-gap/ [https://perma.cc/6QGV-VY4U], (finding that Americans are more socially 
conservative, religious, and less tolerant of homosexuality than European counterparts); Sarah-
Jane Stratford, Conservative Americans are more terrified of sex than violence, THE GUARDIAN 
(Nov. 4, 2013, 1:18 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/04/blue-is-the-
warmest-colour-shocking [https://perma.cc/TX8D-GYXM]; Why You Should Give A $*%! about 
Words that Offend, supra note 191. 
194. See generally Vince Bridgman, Why You Should Care about the Name You Give 
Your Company, BPLANS , http://articles.bplans.com/when-company-names-go-bad/ 
[https://perma.cc/4PCN-S7KX]; Susan Ward, 5 Rules for Choosing a Business Name, BALANCE , 
https://www.thebalance.com/rules-for-choosing-a-business-name-2948575 (last updated Feb. 21, 
2017) [https://perma.cc/Z6YZ-8R84]; Joanna Wiebe, How to Name a Product —Do This, Avoid 
That, COPYHACKERS  (July, 2012), https://copyhackers.com/2012/07/how-to-name-a-product 
[https://perma.cc/W9Y8-8B2P]; Krystal Peak, Company names exposed:  The good, the bad and 
the truly awful, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/ 
blog/2011/11/whats-in-a-name-the-good-and-the-bad.html [https://perma.cc/2KL2-D4SZ] (discussing 
branding expert Alexandra Watkins’ “12-point ‘Smile or Scratch’ test to help businesses test their 
brands or product names—posing the question, ‘When you hear the company name does it make 
you smile or scratch your head?’”). 
195. See Bridgman, supra note 194; Wiebe, supra note 194. 
196. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1327. 
197. Why You Should Give A $*%! about Words that Offend, supra note 191 (asserting 
that although the United States has become more accepting of some swear words over time, there 
is always a category of swear words that remain off limits, and that today, this category includes 
“the racial slurs and epithets that sum up people in some way”).   
198. Power at Last, THE ECONOMIST  (Mar. 31, 2005), http://www.economist.com/node/ 
3810230 [https://perma.cc/PTV9-RMYT]. 
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disparaged by the terms possess this potent and influential power.199  
Offended groups can avoid, ignore, protest, or even boycott a registered 
trademark deemed truly offensive.200  Consumers can not only decline 
to purchase goods or services associated with a mark deemed 
disparaging, they can also make a conscious effort to purchase from a 
competitor with a neutral or positive mark.201  The potential for such 
action incentivizes creators and owners of goods and services to steer 
clear of names that may be deemed racist, sexist, homophobic, 
xenophobic, bigoted, or offensive to other group identities.  
A crucial illustration of this alternative to a section 2(a) 
disparagement ban can be found in the Washington Redskins’ most 
recent experience.  As described above, the Washington Redskins’ 
football team has come under attack for its trademarked team name and 
logo, marks which many find disparaging to Native Americans.202  
                                                           
199. See generally Bridget Brennan, Top 10 Things Everyone Should Know about Women 
Consumers, FORBES (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bridgetbrennan/2015/01/21/ 
top-10-things-everyone-should-know-about-women-consumers/#2059dea8289 [https://perma.cc/ 
M9L9-EAGJ] (explaining that “[w]omen drive 70-80% of all consumer purchasing, through a 
combination of their buying power and influence,” meaning that “even when a woman isn’t 
paying for something herself, she is often the influence or veto vote behind someone else’s 
purchase”); Janie Boschma, Black Consumers Have ‘Unprecedented Impact’ in 2015, ATLANTIC 
(Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/black-consumers-have-
unprecedented-impact-in-2015/433725/ [https://perma.cc/63NV-HE9Q]; Jeff Green, LGBT 
Purchasing Power Near $1 Trillion Rivals Other Minorities in 2015, BLOOMBERG (Jul. 20, 2016, 
10:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-20/lgbt-purchasing-power-near-1-
trillion-rivals-other-minorities [https://perma.cc/GA8T-98ZT] (explaining that in 2015, “[t]he 
combined buying power of U.S. lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender adults rose . . . to $917 
billion”); Nielsen:  Asian-American Buying Power Increased by More than $50 Billion in One 
Year—Expected to Hit $1 Trillion by 2018, NIELSEN (Nov. 6, 2015), http://www.nielsen. 
com/ma/en/press-room/2015/nielsen-asian-american-buying-power-increased-by-more-than-50B-
in-one-year.html [https://perma.cc/JWY4-7XMB], (explaining that in 2014, “Asian-American 
buying power increased 7% from $718 billion to $770 billion . . . and continues to rise”). 
200. 1-3 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 3.04 (2017) (noting that 
“if a mark were truly offensive to a substantial portion of the public, consumers would refuse to 
buy the associated goods or services, which could effectively “remov[e] the mark from the 
marketplace”). 
201. In the past, courts have proposed leaving consumer behavior-related choices to the 
marketplace.  For instance, in Basile v. H&R Block, Inc., 563 Pa. 359, 371 (2000), the court was 
asked to determine whether tax preparation company H&R Block violated agency law through 
deceitful business practices.  Although the court failed to find an agency relationship, it opined 
that “[i]f Block’s method of doing business is worthy of the condemnation that appellees suggest, 
presumably the marketplace will react to correct it.” 
202. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 482 (E.D. Va. 2015); Angela 
R. Riley & Kristen A. Carpenter, Owning Red:  A Theory of Indian (Cultural) Appropriation, 94 
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Despite the backlash against the mark’s use, team owner Daniel Snyder 
decided to keep the Redskins’ name and logo as is.203  His refusal to 
heed public opinion seems to have cost the team.  Because Snyder 
refused to change the team’s marks to something less offensive to 
Native Americans, the team has been prevented from becoming “a 
national powerhouse like the Cowboys.”204  More obviously, the 
Redskins’ devotion to its disparaging trademark has hurt its financial 
growth potential.205  In mid-2014, at the height of the Redskins 
controversy, Redskins merchandise sales were down 35%, even though 
overall NFL merchandise sales were up 3%.206  And even now that the 
Redskins’ trademark was deemed constitutional, consumers show no 
signs of letting up.  As recently as August 2017, Kirk Cousins was the 
only Redskins player to make the Top 50 Player Sales List (based on 
overall sales of all licensed products).207  Perhaps a change to a less 
controversial name would increase ticket and merchandise sales and 
restore the team’s positive perception lost as a result of its trademark 
dispute and subsequent litigation.208  
                                                           
TEX. L. REV. 859, 911 (2016); Peter Keating, Washington Has Everything to Lose, ESPN (Sept. 2, 
2014), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/11419303/washington-redskins-losing-money-keeping 
-name [https://perma.cc/3HPP-KGGK].  
203. Keating, supra note 202. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. Chris Isidore, Redskins Gear Stiff-Armed by Fans, CNN MONEY (Sept. 4, 2014, 3:57 
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/09/04/news/companies/redskins-merchandise/ [https://perma.cc 
/QE98-J9NH]; 
see also Ryan Wilson, Report:  Redskins Merchandise Sales Dropped Sharply in Last Year, CBS 
SPORTS  (Sep. 7, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/report-redskins-merchandise-sales-
dropped-sharply-in-last-year/ [https://archive.is/oqAYz] (reporting that Redskins sales were 
poorer than many teams who failed to make the playoffs in 2014, and that “[n]o NFL team has 
seen a sharper drop in year-over-year merchandise sales in the past year than the Redskins”)).  
207. Scott Allen, Four Cowboys, Plus Colin Kaepernick, Rank ahead of Any Redskins in 
Merchandise Sales, WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dc-
sports-bog/wp/2017/08/01/four-cowboys-plus-colin-kaepernick-rank-ahead-of-any-redskins-in-
merchandise-sales/?utm_term=.2027ff22f257 [https://perma.cc/WR8L-BQ68 ].  It is worth noting 
that even Colin Kaepernick, the NFL player who caused controversy by refusing to stand for the 
National Anthem, ranked over ten spots higher than Kirk Cousins on the Top 50 list.  Id. 
208. Or perhaps the Redskins can learn from Florida State University’s approach to using 
the Native American Seminole as their school mascot:  “For almost 70 years, Florida State has 
BEHNAM 3/22/2018  8:00 PM 
2018] BATTLE OF THE BAND 33 
In addition to dealing financial blows to markholders with 
disparaging marks, consumers can—and do—use their voices to speak 
out against the use of such trademarks.  For example, in recent years, 
popular protests against, and growing distaste for, the Redskins has lead 
sportscasters to avoid using the team’s name on television, prompted 
newspapers to refuse to publish the name,209 and even caused a 
reduction in the team’s number of Twitter followers.210   
This form of consumer-based market regulation would even be 
effective for marks like THE SLANTS, chosen to reclaim once-
disparaging language.  If the negative language has truly regained 
positive meaning amongst a substantial composite of the referenced 
group, then the market will likely respond with neutrality or even 
acceptance and buy-in.  On the other hand, if the disparaging term has 
not yet lost its offensive meaning or been repossessed by the targeted 
group, that mark’s owner can likely expect the form of backlash 
experienced by Snyder and the Washington Redskins, perhaps on a 
smaller scale and stage.211 
These same market concerns apply to markholders who choose to 
select scandalous or immoral marks.  In In re FOX, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed a trademark examiner’s decision to reject registration of the 
mark COCK SUCKER under grounds that the mark was scandalous.212  
Although it is by no means a household name, this brand of rooster-
shaped lollipops has existed since 1979.213  These lollipops are mostly 
                                                           
worked closely, side by side, with the Seminole Tribe of Florida in a relationship that is mutually 
supportive and built on respect.”  The University considers the Seminoles’ history and traditions 
in representing the tribe during games and frequently consults the tribe to ensure accuracy and 
authenticity.  The University has received enthusiastic support from the Seminole Tribal Council, 
a distinction Florida State takes seriously.  Autumn A. Arnett, The Future of Native American 
Imagery in Sports, ATLANTIC (Nov. 21, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/ 
2015/11/native-imagery-in-college-sports/417036/ [https://perma.cc/8W4J-R7CV].   
209. Andrew Beaujon, Here’s a List of Outlets and Journalists Who Won’t Use the Name 
‘Redskins’, POYNTER (June 19, 2014), http://www.poynter.org/2014/heres-a-list-of-outlets-and-
journalists-who-wont-use-the-name-redskins/256258/ [https://perma.cc/KHV9-Q2HX]. 
210. Isidore, supra note 206. 
211. Keating, supra note 202 (noting that in September 2014, the Washington Redskins 
ranked “20th in the NFL with 319,000 Twitter devotees,” although “[t]he team should have [had] 
roughly 60,000 more . . . which would place it 16th in the league”).   
212. In re Fox, 702 F.3d 633, 634 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
213. Id. at 635. 
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displayed in retail-outlets accessible “to fans of the University of South 
Carolina and Jacksonville State University, both of which employ 
gamecocks as their athletic mascots.”214  The lollipops may also serve as 
an amusing gag gift or novelty: distributed as gifts at bachelorette 
parties or shared between juvenile friends.215  Its defining 
characteristic—the name Cock Sucker—does the product’s success a 
greater disservice than a neutral or positive name would.  Although 
children make up a large portion of the candy and lollipop market’s 
target audience, they are not the target market here.  Parents—who 
supply children with their candy—are probably less likely to purchase 
Cock Sucker-branded lollipops for their children over more 
appropriately-named options like Tootsie Pops or Dum-Dums.  
Government fear of losing control over the nation’s morality is 
unfounded; the PTO was already less effective than consumer forces at 
deterring the use of scandalous and immoral marks.  For instance, 
although Cock Sucker lollipops were denied trademark registration, Fox 
could use the unregistered Cock Sucker mark.216  A more effective 
means of deterring the use of immoral, offensive, and vulgar content 
would be for retail stores, en masse, to refuse to carry the offending 
lollipops, for only “adult-themed” stores to purchase the lollipops, or for 
shopkeepers to place the lollipops on a higher and less visible shelf.  
The Fox court itself pointed out that if the plaintiff was “correct that the 
mark at issue ‘bring[s] [nothing] more than perhaps a smile to the face 
of the prospective purchaser, . . . then the market will no doubt reward 
her ingenuity.”217  The market can—and often does—decide how much 
exposure a product receives, how popular it will become, and how many 
sales it will garner.  In a nation generally hesitant to embrace scandalous 
and vulgar images, terms, and products, finding great success with a 
scandalous mark is a challenging feat, with or without PTO approval. 
In his concurring opinion in Matal, Justice Kennedy wrote that 
“[t]he First Amendment does not entrust” the power to protect the 
public from offensive speech “to the government’s benevolence.  
                                                           
214. Id. 
215. Similarly, in In re Brunetti the TTAB acknowledged that the scandalous mark at 
issue in its case—’FUCT’—represents a “niche market,” one that is strong but small nevertheless.  
In re Brunetti, 2014 WL 3976439, at *11. 
216. In re Fox, 702 F.3d at 640. 
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Instead, our reliance must be on the substantial safeguards of free and 
open discussion in a democratic society.”218  Fear of low sales and bad 
publicity will compel most trademark registrants to choose marks that 
are less offensive or polarizing and more neutral, safe, and harmless.  
This form of market-based trademark regulation is the type of safeguard 
Justice Kennedy envisioned in Matal, a realistic compromise between 
the government’s desire to protect consumers from disparaging, 
scandalous, and immoral language and our nation’s dedication to 
protecting its First Amendment rights. 
E. Section 2(a)’s Future 
Experts seem to believe that the Matal “decision will apply equally 
to the section 2(a) bar for ‘immoral’ and ‘scandalous’ terms.”219  
Significantly, following the Federal Circuit’s decision in Tam, the 
government itself “conceded that the holding . . . requires the 
invalidation of Section 2(a)’s prohibition against registering scandalous 
and immoral marks as well.”220  “[W]hen the USPTO denies registration 
to marks that it deems to be “immoral” or “scandalous,” it does so on 
the basis that the government disapproves of the expressive message 
conveyed in the mark.”221  Disapproval of a message, which was not 
enough for the Matal Court, is unlikely to save the fate of section 2(a)’s 
ban on scandalous or immoral marks in In re Brunetti.   
Matal has already determined that trademarks are neither 
government speech, nor a form of government subsidy, nor a type of 
government program.222  If the government cannot silence a hateful 
mark, it is unlikely it can silence a distasteful one.  In finding section 
2(a)’s disparagement clause unconstitutional, Matal was clear: “[T]he 
government never can attempt to regulate speech based on its 
                                                           
218. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1769. 
219. J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, §19:77 
(5th ed., 2017). 
220. Id. 
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BEHNAM 3/22/2018  8:00 PM 
36 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1 
offensiveness.”223  Like the terms REDSKINS or SLANT, the term 
FUCT is undoubtedly offensive to many. 224  The government, however, 
should not be allowed to reject scandalous marks while barred from 
rejecting disparaging ones.  If Matal instructs us to protect the freedom 
to express even hateful thoughts, 225 this directive should logically 
include speech considered immoral or scandalous.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Scholars have hailed Matal as “the most important free speech 
case of the year.”226  It is worth noting that because The Slants have 
won, so have the Redskins.  As Simon Tam and his band celebrate 
finally being able to benefit from a trademark they assert is reclaiming a 
derogatory term, so too do the Redskins regain their ability to profit 
from their racially insensitive trademarks.  Yet, our consumer-regulated 
market dictates that this should not be a cause for concern.  By 
accepting certiorari for Tam over the Redskins, the Supreme Court 
clearly chose the more sympathetic plaintiff.  American consumers, 
however, will likely not be as sympathetic to holders of disparaging 
trademarks.  
With Matal v. Tam, the Supreme Court altered the Lanham Act to 
better align it with our changing societal standards and to conform with 
the U.S. Constitution.  The Federal Circuit now has an opportunity to 
make the same great strides with In re Brunetti.  Section 2(a) of the 
Lanham Act is vague, creates uncertainties for trademark examiners and 
markholders, impedes our First Amendment right to free speech, and 
stands in stark conflict with the Lanham Act’s purpose and trademark 
law’s principles.  Denying trademark registration to disparaging, 
scandalous, and immoral marks exposes markholders to financial harm, 
while allowing others to reap where the original markholder has sown.  
It also exposes consumers to possible confusion and deceit.  
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Eliminating section 2(a)’s ban on disparaging, scandalous, and 
immoral marks is the best solution to the problems it currently presents.  
And, a finding that these provisions of section 2(a) are unconstitutional 
is unlikely to inundate the PTO with trademark applications for 
disparaging marks.  Rather, our consumer-driven market will continue 
to ensure that controversial or derogatory products and services will 
find less success than their counterparts.  
Our nation is in a different place now than when Simon Tam first 
began his legal battle.  Recent events have displayed an uptick in racial, 
political, and gender tensions and sensitivities, particularly in the wake 
of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.227  Despite this, Matal reaffirms 
the notion that free speech must remain free, even if it is hateful. 
In 2017, The Slants released their latest album, entitled “The Band 
Who Must Not Be Named,” a play on their years spent in trademark 
limbo while fighting for their right to federal trademark recognition.  
After a long battle, The Slants have finally won their right to freedom of 
expression; their efforts now afford many others that same right. 
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